



Intelligence

MASTER FILE COPY

**DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON**

~~Top Secret~~

25X1

Near East and South Asia Review

25X1

**Supplement
11 March 1988**

~~Top Secret~~

NESA NESAR 88-007C

11 March 1988

Copy 261

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret

25X1

**Near East and
South Asia Review**

25X1

Supplement

11 March 1988

Page

Articles	Soviet Arms Sales to Iran: Rumors Persist	1	25X1
			25X1
	The Soviet Union is reported to have resumed direct supply of arms to Iran.		25X1
			225X1
	Iran: Seeking Expanded Influence in Sudan	3	25X1
			25X1
	Iran is pursuing relations with Sudan, whose influence as an important Arab and African state could serve Iran's political interest in its war with Iraq. Religious, cultural, and security differences hinder Iran's influence in Sudan.		25X1
	Mauritania-Senegal: Bad Blood	5	25X1
			25X1
	Deteriorating relations between Mauritania and Senegal could threaten the stability of Mauritania's fragile regime and jeopardize Senegal's long-term development.		25X1

Some articles in the Near East and South Asia Review are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the view of a single analyst; an item like this will be designated as a noncoordinated view.

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

NESA NESAR 88-007C

11 March 1988

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Near East and
South Asia Review

25X1

Articles

Soviet Arms Sales to Iran:
Rumors Persist

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] We cannot rule out, [Redacted] Soviet deliveries of small arms to Iran or agreements by the USSR to supply Tehran with weapons following an end to the Iran-Iraq war. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

The Soviet Union had provided Iran with over \$350 million worth of arms since the onset of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980, but to our knowledge the last direct transfer of weapons from the Soviet Union to Iran occurred in 1984. Despite its unwillingness to ship arms, Moscow has continued over the last four years to permit its East European allies to supply small arms and ammunition to the Iranians. The Soviets have vetoed—at least until recently— attempts by the East Europeans to sell Tehran major weaponry.' Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact sales since 1984 have averaged some \$400 million per year. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Iranian Requests. Since the United States reflagged 11 Kuwaiti oil tankers and expanded its naval presence in the Persian Gulf last May, Iran has intensified its efforts to procure arms from the Soviet Union:

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

Top Secret

25X1

NESA NESAR 88-007C

25X1

11 March 1988

Top Secret

25X1

Persistent Claims.

25X1

25X1

Iran's public allusions to such deals probably stem from a desire to warn the United States that pressure on Tehran could foster improved Iranian relations with Washington's primary adversary. [redacted] have coincided with Iranian press statements that tend in general to exaggerate modest improvements in Soviet-Iranian cooperation. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Minimal Impact Sales? Moscow's reluctance to supply arms directly to Iran probably results from the damage such sales would inflict on Soviet-Iraqi relations and the possibility that major weapons shipments could alter the course of the Iran-Iraq war. If the Soviet Union were to agree to an arms package with Tehran, it is likely that the Soviets would take pains to conceal such a deal and probably would not supply major weapon systems such as long-range surface-to-air missiles, fighter aircraft, tanks, or surface-to-surface missiles. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Iran's size, oil wealth, and location have long prompted Moscow to regard it as the "strategic prize" of the region. Therefore, Moscow has an incentive to renew delivery of small arms that might avoid provoking Iraqi anger and would have a minimal impact on the course of the war. Although sales of small arms probably would do little to diminish the clerical regime's basic distrust of the USSR, Moscow might judge that renewal of an arms supply relationship could improve the prospects for closer relations with any future Iranian government. [redacted]

Future Sales.

25X1

25X1

Moscow may intend to begin the supply of arms to Iran following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war. Such a course would be Moscow's most effective method of initiating military cooperation with Tehran while avoiding some of the negative repercussions of arms transfers during the war. Short of direct sales, the Soviets could increase the flow of weapons to Iran from their East European allies by permitting sales of more advanced arms. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1




25X1

Iran: Seeking Expanded Influence in Sudan



25X1

Iran is pursuing relations with Sudan, whose influence as an important Arab and African state could serve Iran's political interests in its war with Iraq. Sudan's Islamic heritage makes it a target for Iran's efforts to export its radical agenda. Religious, cultural, and security differences, however, limit Iran's influence in Sudan. Moreover, Iraq and Saudi Arabia are trying to counter Iranian influence, and, in the near term, major Iranian gains are unlikely.



25X1


25X1

Background

Relations between Iran and Sudan were tenuous under the regime of President Jaafar Nimeiri because of Tehran's influence in Sudan's internal affairs. They reached their nadir on 12 June 1982 when Nimeiri ordered all Iranian Embassy personnel to leave Sudan. Relations have improved under Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, and Iran is seeking to promote bilateral ties. When Sadiq visited Tehran in December 1986, he said that he viewed Iran's Islamic revolution as having a "beneficial aspect for all." For Iran's part, Foreign Minister Velayati explained that Tehran saw Sudan as "a strong pillar of Islam in Africa" and commented that "the one path leading to the salvation of oppressed African nations lay in Islam."




Iran wants support from another Arab country for its position in its war with Iraq. Sudanese support would be a useful counterweight to Iraq's push for a united Arab stand against Iran. Sudan's African character could be of particular value to Iran's effort to woo Sub-Saharan African countries. Moreover, Sudan's Islamic heritage makes it receptive to Iran's style of revolution.



Influencing the Sudanese Party Apparatus

Iran is trying to make inroads in Sudanese political parties. Tehran has been cultivating the dominant Umma Party. According to US Embassy reporting, scholarships have been provided to Umma youth to study in Iran.



25X1

25X1

Iran is pursuing contacts with Turabi's National Islamic Front, which is the main opposition to Sadiq's ruling coalition. The US Embassy in Khartoum comments that rumors persist about personal ties between leaders of the National Islamic Front, including Turabi, and Iranian religious figures and that the Front admires the Iranian model of a nonaligned Islamic state. The National Islamic Front, which is the political wing of the largest Muslim Brotherhood faction, gives Iran potential access to that organization.



25X1

25X1

Tehran is working to promote cultural relations with Sudan as well. Iran recently announced the establishment of a Sudanese-Iranian friendship society. This will provide another conduit for Iranian activity in Khartoum.



25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Islamic and Revolutionary Groups

Tehran wants to strengthen bilateral relations with Islamic groups in Sudan. Leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, the principal fundamentalist group in Sudan, have expressed admiration for Iran and are convinced that Sudan must become an Islamic state. According to press reports, Ali Shammu, Minister of National Guidance and Information under President Nimeiri, claims that Iran was behind the attempt by members of the Muslim Brotherhood to seize power at the beginning of 1985. Eighty members of the Brotherhood were arrested in the crackdown following the attempted takeover. Although Iran was not the sole motivating factor behind the Brotherhood, it was involved. Tehran must tread softly, however, when dealing with Islamic elements in Sudan, since similar activities led to the expulsion of the Iranians by Nimeiri in June 1982.

Iran is developing contacts with revolutionary groups such as the Libyan-backed Sudanese Revolutionary Committees.

Obstacles to Iranian Influence

Iran faces obstacles that will limit its influence in Sudan.

Tehran must battle Saudi influence. In early July 1987 the Saudis delayed a grant-in-aid to the Sudanese military of \$130 million because of Sadiq's trip to Iran the previous month. Sudan's financial relations with Saudi Arabia will be a sticking point for Iranian efforts in Sudan.

Religious and cultural differences hinder Iranian efforts as well. The majority of Sudanese Muslims, who make up three-quarters of the population, are Sunni and not receptive to Iran's militant brand of Shia Islam. According to US Embassy reporting, the

heads of both major Islamic parties in the ruling coalition have criticized Iran's version of Islam. The leader of Sudan's Democratic Unionist Party, Muhammad Utham Mirghani, has expressed strong disagreement with the Prime Minister's pursuit of improved relations with Iran, saying, "We cannot trust those fanatics." The followers of the National Islamic Front claim to reject the excesses of Iranian revolution and find a significant ideological gap between themselves and Tehran. In the south, the majority of Sudanese are either Christians or animists and therefore not likely to be susceptible to the appeal of revolutionary Islam.

Sudan's internal security organs have been a barrier to Iran's influence. During Nimeiri's regime, the security services monitored the subversive activity of the Iranian Embassy staff, which led to their expulsion. Under Sadiq, the security organs keep a close watch on Iranians involved with the news media and foreign nationals and Iranians renting houses that can be used for propaganda center. In particular, they monitor the Iranian Embassy in Kartoum.

Prospects

In the near term Iran has only modest prospects for expanded influence in Sudan. Sudanese Government suspicions of Iran's intentions as well as pressure from Saudi Arabia and Iraq are counterweights. Iran will continue to cultivate Sudanese Islamic groups, but some of these groups will be wary of Iran's blandishments. Iran's long-term prospects could improve, however, if it is persistent and willing to invest substantial amounts of aid to accompany its propaganda.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

**Mauritania-Senegal:
Bad Blood**

25X1

Deteriorating relations between Mauritania and Senegal could threaten the stability of Mauritania's fragile regime and jeopardize Senegal's long-term development projects. [REDACTED]

Vulnerable Mauritania

Last October Mauritanian President Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya narrowly averted a violent coup attempt by black military officers of the Toucouleur tribe. Subsequently, a Mauritanian court sentenced three of those officers to death and gave 44 others terms ranging from five years to life. In addition, the government dismissed several hundred Toucouleurs from the Army and Gendarmerie, and it reassigned others from Nouakchott to remote locations in the interior. It also arrested several dozen Toucouleur civilians it suspected were engaging in dissident activities. [REDACTED]

We believe the coup attempt is an ominous development for the Taya regime and reflects Mauritania's serious racial divisions. The black population of southern Mauritania is bitter at the white Maurs' monopoly of power and may be increasingly ready to turn to violence to redress its grievances. According to the US Embassy, the Maurs—the traditional Arab elite in Mauritania—account for 30 to 45 percent of the population of this almost entirely Islamic country and have a tight grip on both the government and the economy. Mauritania's three principal black tribes are fundamentally different from the Maurs in psychology, culture, and background. The blacks make up the majority of the military's enlisted personnel, the lower grades of the civil service, and the unskilled labor force. Caught between these two groups is the Haratin, a black, largely Arabic-speaking, former slave sector of society that includes an estimated 25 to 40 percent of the population. Members of the Haratin occupy servile positions.

[REDACTED]

Since Mauritania received its independence from France in 1960, the black tribes have grown increasingly dissatisfied with their subordinate position, and, in recent years, their discontent has begun to spread to the Haratin. The Maurs, for their part, worry that the blacks will try to supplant them and change the character of the country from Arab to black African. The anxiety of the Maurs is increased by their awareness that the black and Haratin populations are increasing faster than their own. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Senegalese Meddling

Although there is no direct evidence linking Dakar to the plotters, Taya believes Senegal was aware of the coup attempt. According to the US Embassy in Nouakchott, the Mauritians discovered a cache of 100 automatic weapons and large numbers of grenades at the homes of some Toucouleurs in Nouakchott. These weapons are alleged to have been obtained in Senegal and were the type issued to the Senegalese armed forces. In addition, Dakar has given refuge to 18 Toucouleur prisoners who escaped—including several of the coup plotters. Nouakchott believes this action makes Senegal a de facto accomplice of the Toucouleurs. Taya sees this Senegalese connection as a serious threat to his country's stability and is trying to get Dakar to return the escaped plotters. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

The View From Dakar

The Senegalese see things differently. Senegal has a significant Toucouleur population and sees its black kinsmen in Mauritania discriminated against as the Maurs continue to monopolize power, land, and key government positions. The Diouf government probably has been under pressure to aid the Toucouleurs. Nonetheless, it believes its interests are not served by allowing the tension to get out of hand, particularly as the country faces a national election. Although it is refusing to assist Mauritania and extradite the dissidents, it also is refusing to actively support them. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

NESA NESAR 88-007C

11 March 1988

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Senegal almost certainly has concluded that, if a Toucouleur plot were to succeed, Dakar itself would face serious security problems. It would threaten stability along the border and require more security forces in the north at a time when significant Senegalese armed forces are pinned down in Gambia and Casamance. Outside powers, such as Libya or Algeria, might attempt to intervene. Such developments could threaten Senegal's river basin development and with it Dakar's gamble on irrigated agriculture as the answer to food self-sufficiency.

Outlook

We believe that neither government wants a showdown. Nevertheless, both are playing a dangerous game. If the negative attitudes drag on much longer, they could develop a dynamic of their own. According to the US Embassy in Dakar, there are groups within Senegal that are pushing for a harder line. Among the Senegalese Toucouleurs, there is a strong anti-Mauritanian attitude, ranging from bitter criticism to a call for war and a partitioning of Mauritania between Morocco and Senegal. We believe both sides would lose in such a conflict. Taya's fragile regime could be overthrown, but Diouf's development project along the river would also be threatened.

Mauritania Ups the Ante

President Taya has tried to ease the tension. In late January he released 150 Senegalese common criminals as a gesture to Diouf. Senegalese press criticism of this action angered Taya, who recalled his ambassador to Senegal.

Consequently, Mauritania has decided to issue a white paper linking the Toucouleur conspirators with the Israelis to embarrass the Senegalese Government for aiding Mauritanian dissidents.

It will explain

that this was an Israeli plot to drive a wedge between the Arab and black countries in Africa.

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret